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Abstract
We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in
a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly,
it enjoys economies of scope whose size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to the
regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and
quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the
competitors.
Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private
information, so that regulation is less eﬃcient and the unregulated market too may be adversely
aﬀected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the firm to integrate productions is (socially)
desirable, unless joint production is characterized by dis-economies of scope.
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1

Introduction

In many sectors the boundaries between regulation and competition are blurred and often go
through firms that operate both in regulated and competitive segments. For example, Centrica
in the UK operates both in gas and electricity transmission and in some competitive segments of
energy sectors as well as in telecommunications and financial services. GDF-Suez in France and
other countries, RWE in Germany, and Enel in Italy all operate in regulated as well as unregulated
markets in energy, water and other utility sectors. In the US a major utility such as Pepco also
oﬀers energy management services. Local telephone operators such as the regional Bell operating
companies also provide unregulated broadband Internet services. In Europe hundreds of municipal
enterprises (e.g. in Italy, Germany or Scandinavian countries) oﬀer a wide array of services in both
regulated and unregulated sectors.1
The diversification of regulated firms into competitive sectors as well, thus leading to “conglomerates”, has raised substantial objections from regulatory institutions in the EU, in the US, as well
as in other countries. The institutional response to utilities’ expansion into unregulated sectors
has often been very negative, if sometimes diﬀerentiated. In the EU several Directives referring to
utility services have stated that firms in regulated sectors that want to operate in competitive sectors as well must “unbundle”, i.e. separate the assets and the personnel of the two sectors.2 In the
US, some regional Bell operating companies have been prohibited from expanding into unregulated
long distance services.
This institutional response has been motivated by the fear that it may imbalance competition
in the unregulated sectors (a “level playing field” argument), and aﬀect negatively consumers in
the regulated markets due to the increased complexity of the regulatory task.
This paper assesses these concerns, in order to determine whether allowing the regulated firm
to operate in the competitive sector increases or decreases social welfare. Our response is positive,
as we show that total welfare increases when diversification is allowed. The concern of regulators
that allowing diversification may harm consumers in the regulated market is not supported by our
model, even if diversification actually entails an informational advantage of the diversified firm
relative to both the regulator and the rival firms. On the contrary, we show that the presence
of a competitive market where the regulated firm operates often increases the eﬃciency of the
regulatory constraint. Even when this does not happen, the possible regulatory problems have no
1

This diversification is partly the consequence of utility de-regulation, taking place at diﬀerent pace in diﬀerent
sectors, some of which have already been deregulated and liberalized, whilst others remain heavily regulated.
2
The unbundling may be of several types. The Directives require at least separate accounts and sometimes separate
companies which may or may not belong to diﬀerent shareholders.
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eﬀect on consumers in the monopoly market. Moreover, the presence of a diversified monopolist in
the competitive market needs not distort competition and damage consumers. The overall eﬀect of
diversification on total welfare is thus positive.
There are several reasons for regulated firms to expand and diversify into unregulated markets.
For example, a multi-market strategy may facilitate collusion. Or regulated activities may leave
some free-cash flow that managers invest in unregulated sectors so they can then operate aggressively in those markets or just because they are “empire builders”. However, the most commonly
cited motivation goes under the heading “synergy”, the buzz-word indicating economies of scope
in the joint production and supply of horizontally diversified services. In this respect, the main
concern that we want to emphasize is that the amount of cost savings is generally unknown both
to the regulator and to the competitors in unregulated markets, and it is private information of the
conglomerate.3 Hence, both competitors and the regulator of a complex multi-product firm may
suﬀer a very substantial asymmetry of information.
In this paper we assess the trade-oﬀ between the potential benefits and costs of conglomerate
firms. First we study how a conglomerate operates in both a regulated and an unregulated sector,
where it competes with rivals either in prices or in quantities for possibly diﬀerentiated goods. The
magnitude of scope economies is the private information of the conglomerate when it is allowed
to “bundle” its productions.4 With this respect, the regulatory process and the conglomerate’s
activity in the regulated market (e.g. the price) may reveal important information to competitors
about the costs of the conglomerate. In other terms, the game in the unregulated market may
or may not be one of asymmetric information, depending on the information generated by the
regulatory process; this in turn aﬀects the conglomerate’s behavior in its regulated market, i.e. its
incentives to disclose information to the regulator.
The eﬀects of this informational externality from the regulated to the unregulated market depend on what type of competition obtains in the unregulated market. When firms compete in
quantity, the regulator can more easily elicit information on scope economies, reducing distortions
in the regulated sector. Acting as if economies of scope were small so as to obtain lenient regulation,
3
For example, in a joint document issued by British sectoral utility regulators (OFWAT, 1998), it is made clear
that for regulators, external auditors, as well as for rival firms, measuring scope economies is complex and often
inconclusive, especially when conducted before integration takes place. Event studies of abnormal stock returns in
mergers (see Berry, 2000 and Leggio and Lien, 2000) as well as the few direct econometric studies (e.g., Fraquelli,
Piacenza and Vannoni, 2004), do not allow one to reach clear cut conclusions. In a survey of multi-utilities’ managers ("EU Multi-utilities," Marketline International, 1998, London), respondents showed a great variability in their
assessment of the cost savings from diversification.
4
Our model can be also reinterpreted as one where consumers get higher utility from “one stop shop” (e.g. when
joint billing lowers transaction costs): the cross-market eﬀect goes through the utility function rather than economies
of scope.

2

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 316 [2009]

the conglomerate gets the countervailing eﬀect of inducing the rival firms to expand in the unregulated market. With price competition, by contrast, the informational externality complicates the
regulatory process since behaving as if scope economies were small prompts an accommodating
reaction by the rivals in the unregulated market. The regulator may thus be forced to apply a uniform regulatory policy (regardless of the actual size of the scope economies) so that no information
is disclosed to rivals.
After discussing the eﬀects of unregulated activities (and of such features as the size of the
unregulated market and the number of competitors) on the optimally regulated price, we compare
welfare when the conglomerate is allowed to run joint productions for the two markets with that
with compulsory separation preventing a firm from exploiting its economies of scope for the sake
of regulatory clarity. On the one hand, if economies of scope are substantial, consumers in the two
markets may benefit from the gain in eﬃciency. On the other hand, since scope economies is the
private information of the conglomerate, the lack of information for the regulator and competitors
distorts the price in the regulated market and also competition in the unregulated market.5 We
show that, even though horizontal integration causes informational problems for regulation and for
competitors, these adverse eﬀects are smaller than the eﬃciency gains from integration. Letting
the conglomerate integrate its operations is desirable unless there are diseconomies of scope, which
may be the case, for example, if the managers of the regulated firm expand simply to build their
empires.
It is important to stress that the key to our result is not that the regulator is able to internalize
some of the eﬃciency generated by the joint production. Conglomerate integration increases the
diﬃculty of the regulatory contract and may bring about negative spillovers on the unregulated
markets. The point in our results is that these issues — usually placed at the centre of the policy
debate and used to justify the aforementioned institutional responses — are more than compensated
by the greater eﬃciency of the firm.
Some early papers, such as Braeutigam and Panzar (1989), Brennan (1990), Brennan and
Palmer (1994), addressed the problems and the desirability of horizontal diversification mainly
in terms of cross-subsidies. This literature analyzes cost shifting, in which an integrated firm attributes to the regulated activity costs that actually pertain to non-regulated ones and thus obtains
higher regulated prices, while at the same time behaving more aggressively in the unregulated sectors. Another pertinent analysis is Sappington (2003), in a model where eﬀort can be allocated
5
It is well known from the literature on information sharing in oligopolies (see Sakai 1985 and Vives 1999, Chapter
8, for a survey) that total welfare may be reduced when firms compete under asymmetric information.
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to regulated and unregulated activities. Although the analysis of optimal regulated prices and
competition in the unregulated market remains limited by modelling choice, Sappington oﬀers an
interesting discussion of optimal regulatory policy towards diversification that complements our
analysis. He shows that for diversification to be undesirable two conditions must hold at the same
time: the regulator cannot control eﬀort diversion and also the firm can inflate expenditures (by
cost padding) on unregulated activities. These papers illustrate the potential risks of diversification in terms of cross-subsidies and eﬀort diversion. Lewis and Sappington (1989) instead study
a model where the costs of regulated activities are positively correlated with profitability in the
unregulated sector. Within this setting and with a black-boxed description of profitability in the
competitive market, they show how “countervailing incentives” may aﬀect regulation.6 Countervailing incentives have also been discussed in Iossa (1999) who considers the design of a regulated
two-product industry with interdependent and unknown demand. She shows that whether an integrated monopolist or two separate firms is desirable depends on the interplay between the demand
complementarity/substitutability of the two products.
Our analysis diﬀers from all these papers on several respects. We emphasize that integrated
production is both a source of scope economies but also of private information for the conglomerate
with respect to the regulators and its rivals. The informational issues arise exactly from joint
production in that neither the regulator nor the rivals know the exact magnitude of scope economies.
Hence, our analysis complements that on eﬀort diversion in the previous papers. Unlike the papers
cited, we explicitly account for the reactions of the unregulated market to the regulatory decisions
(of the regulator and the conglomerate). Explicitly describing the unregulated market we can
properly study if and when the regulated firm might have an unfair advantage in that market and
how the rivals react to the information generated by regulation itself. Furthermore, in assessing the
desirability of integrated production we consider welfare in both sectors so that we can take into
account the potential negative eﬀects of lack of information on the unregulated market as well.
This paper also complements Vickers (1995) analysis. While that paper specifically addresses
the issue of vertically related markets, where the same firm is regulated upstream and competes
downstream with others, here we consider horizontally related markets. In our paper, the regulated
firm’s rivals do not need to purchase the regulated good, but still are aﬀected by the cost saving
that the integrated firm enjoys by operating both services.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the contract theory literature by considering an environ6
Chaaban (2004) studies the eﬀects of various cost-apportionment rules for a joint fixed cost that is privately
known by the multi-utility.
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ment in which (i) the agent (the conglomerate) has private information on the complementarity
between a contractible and a non contractible variable (respectively the regulated output and the
firm’s activity in the unregulated market); (ii) the optimal (regulatory) contract at the same time
screens the agent’s type and signals this private information (to the firms in the unregulated market). This informational externality that plays such an important role in our analysis of regulated
and unregulated markets also arise in diﬀerent contexts. For example, Calzolari and Pavan (2006)
study the optimal disclosure of information between two sellers who contract sequentially with the
same privately-informed buyer, showing that the upstream seller may gain by disclosing information downstream when there are countervailing incentives or if the goods of the two sellers are
substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes
of benchmark cases, with full information and separation of activities. Section 4 derives optimal
regulation when the conglomerate is allowed to integrate. Section 5 uses these results to study the
welfare eﬀects of integration in the case of quantity and of price competition. Section 6 concludes.
All the proofs are in the Appendix.

2

Model Set-up

We consider a regulated natural monopoly (market R) and an unregulated oligopoly (market U ).
Demand functions in regulated and unregulated markets are independent, decreasing and (twice)
diﬀerentiable. Inverse demand in the regulated market R is p(q) where q is output. The unregulated
market U consists of n firms indexed by i = 1, ..., n, each producing (possibly diﬀerentiated) output
U
yi with price pU
i . Inverse demand functions are pi (yi , Y−i ) i = 1, ..., n, where Y−i denotes the

vector of the outputs of other firms. The vectors of prices and outputs in the unregulated market
are denoted by pU and Y respectively. Competition in the unregulated sector takes place either in
quantities or in prices.
A “conglomerate” firm operates in both markets, respectively producing outputs q and y1 (index
i = 1 will denote the conglomerate firm in market U ). This firm may be allowed to run productions
in the two markets jointly, or may be forced to organize productions in separate units (unbundling).
In the latter case, separating productions makes impossible for the conglomerate to share assets
and internal resources that may bring about cost savings. Formally, let C (q, y1 ; θ) denote the total
production cost of the conglomerate with joint production, where θ is an eﬃciency parameter.
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If instead separation is imposed, the conglomerate’s total costs is C (0, y1 ; θ) + C (q, 0; θ) . Joint
production thus generates a cost saving corresponding to
C (0, y1 ; θ) + C (q, 0; θ) − C (q, y1 ; θ) ≥ 0,

(1)

which is nil when either q = 0 or y1 = 0. The size of scope economies is parametrized by θ so that
the expression in (1) is nil if θ = 0 and, for any θ00 ≥ θ0 ,
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
C 0, y1 ; θ00 + C q, 0; θ00 − C q, y1 ; θ00 ≥ C 0, y1 ; θ0 + C q, 0; θ0 − C q, y1 ; θ0 ,

¢
¡
¢
¡
with C q, y1 ; θ00 = C q, y1 ; θ0 if either q = 0 or y1 = 0. Thus, the larger is θ the higher are scope

economies and, if separation is imposed, θ has no bite on costs.7 Assuming that the cost function is

twice diﬀerentiable with respect to q and y1 , the previous conditions imply that (i) a larger output
for one of the two markets induces a marginal cost reduction for the output in the other market,
(ii) this cost reduction is larger the higher is θ (and vanishing when θ = 0),
∂ 2 C(q, y1 ; θ0 )
∂ 2 C(q, y1 ; θ00 )
≤
≤ 0, for any θ00 ≥ θ0 ,
∂q∂y1
∂q∂y1

(2)

and (iii) a higher value of θ (weakly) reduces the marginal cost for both outputs,
∂C(q, y1 ; θ0 )
∂C(q, y1 ; θ00 )
≤
for z ∈ {q, y1 } and any θ00 ≥ θ0 .
∂z
∂z

(3)

The following specification of the cost function, that we will use in some examples, satisfies all the
previous properties,
C1 (q, y1 ; θ) = c(q + y1 ) − θqy1 .

(4)

The technology available to all other firms in market U (i.e. firms with index i = 2, ..., n) is
simply C (yi ) ≡ C (0, y1 ; θ) for any yi = y1 and profits are
π i (yi , Y−i ) ≡ yi pU
i (Y ) − C (yi ) .

(5)

When the firm is allowed to integrate production its total profit Π is (the apex I will stand for
7

Although we concentrate on economies of scope related to variable costs, when scope economies are due to
common fixed costs some cost-allocation rule is required by the regulator typically allocating fixed costs proportionally
to outputs. This may re-introduce variable-cost non separability as in the present setting (see Calzolari, 2001 and
Chaaban, 2004).
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integration)
ΠI (q, y1 , Y−1 ; θ) ≡ qp (q) + y1 pU
1 (Y ) − C (q, y1 ; θ) − T,

(6)

where T is a tax/transfer which is part of the regulatory contract in market R (see below). On
the contrary, if the conglomerate must keep apart its production for the two markets, its profit
becomes ΠS + π 1 (y1 , Y−1 ) (the apex S will stand for separation) where
ΠS ≡ qp (q) − C (q, 0; θ) − T.

(7)

The regulator maximizes social welfare W which is a weighted sum of net consumer surplus in
the two markets, firms profits and taxes (or transfers). Let Vj denote gross consumer surplus in
sector j = R, U . The welfare function then is
W = VR (q) − qp (q) + VU (Y ) − Y pU (Y ) + T + α(Π +
where Y pU (Y ) =

Pn

U
i=1 yi pi

n
X

π i ),

(8)

i=2

(Y ) and the weight to profits is α < 1.8 The regulatory contract

contemplates a quantity q and the transfer (T ) to the firm. By definition of unregulated market U ,
the institutional set-up is such that the regulator cannot explicitly control output (of single firms
or total output) in that market.
By directly operating joint production, a firm is able to realize much better than the regulator
and the rival firms whether there are economies of scopes and, if so, their actual magnitude. Hence,
the exact value of θ is private information of the conglomerate and neither the regulator, nor the
competitors in the unregulated market know it. For simplicity, we assume there are no other pieces
of private information. This is clearly a simplification as regulation of a standard single-product
firm is also often aﬀected by informational issues. We employ this assumption to single out the
eﬀects of asymmetric information explicitly related to economies of scope and to the complexity
of conglomerates. It is common knowledge that scope economies can be either high or low, i.e.
© ª
θ ∈ Θ ≡ θ, θ with ν = Pr(θ = θ̄) = 1 − Pr(θ = θ), θ ≥ θ and we rule out dis-economies of scope,
i.e. θ ≥ 0 (see the discussion in Section 6 on the possibility of dis-economies).9
8

As usual we assume α < 1 to avoid the well-known Loeb-Magat paradox and we will not consider the cost of
public funds which in any case would not qualitatively alter our analysis. This would also be the case if the regulator
weights the surpluses in the two markets diﬀerently. We will also not discuss the possibility that the regulator uses
diﬀerent weights to profits of regulated and unregulated firms. In a diﬀerent context of regulation, this is analyzed
by Calzolari and Scarpa (2009).
9
The restriction to two types is only for ease of exposition, and an extension to a continuum of types would not
qualitatively aﬀect our results. The basic references for regulation under asymmetric information are Baron and
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The timing of the game is the following:
1. The regulator decides whether or not to impose separation of productions to the conglomerate
firm, then accordingly sets and publicly announces the regulatory policy.
2. The firm learns the size of scope economies, i.e. its type θ, and then decides in which markets
to operate. Regulation is enforced.
3. Finally, competition in the unregulated sector takes place.
Stage 2 indicates that the conglomerate is not obliged to participate the regulated market
and will do so only if it finds it profitable. As we will discuss, if the firm wants to serve the
regulated market, then it always prefers to bundle production in the two sectors, if allowed to do
so. Finally, the timing also shows that the execution of a regulatory contract naturally anticipates
the determination of the equilibrium in the competitive sector. Indeed, regulation usually follows
procedures and activities which are more complicated to modify than price decisions of private
firms.
The exact magnitude of scope economies becomes clear to the conglomerate if it is allowed to
integrate production and eﬀectively does so. In this respect, we thus regard as impractical the
possibility to condition the decision concerning joint or separate production on the realization of
θ. This would require letting the conglomerate set up integrated production, learn θ and then
subsequently impose separation by splitting productions if scope economies turn out to be low.
Notice therefore that the regulator’s decision on separation/integration cannot be made conditional
on the specific regulatory policy and/or on the actual realization of θ.10
Notice that whether or not integration is allowed, the number of firms in the unregulated market
is assumed to be constant, equal to n. If integration instead entailed a reduction in the number of
firms active in U , then we would have a “trivial” anti-competitive eﬀect of integration.

3

Eﬃcient regulation

In this section we introduce two benchmarks which will help to discuss the pros and cons of joint
production in the presence of asymmetric information. We first analyze the case where separation
of productions is imposed, and then we study the case with joint productions and full information.
Myerson (1982) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1986).
10
In the sequel we will nevertheless argue that even if one considers this possibility, this entails no qualitative
change in our main results.
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Optimal regulation with separate productions Since asymmetric information matters only
in case of joint production, the regulated firm’s profit in sector R with separation is simply as in
(7). Let firm i’s equilibrium output in sector U be defined as y S which depends neither on θ nor on
¡
¢
S ≥ 0. The regulator then maximizes (8) with respect
q and the associated profits π S ≡ π i yiS , Y−i
to q and T, subject to the participation constraint of the regulated firm, which assures that the

conglomerate wants to serve (also) the regulated market, i.e. ΠS + π S ≥ π S . Welfare can be written
as follows
W S = VR (q) + VU (Y S ) − C [q, 0; θ] −

X
i=1

C(y S ) − (1 − α)(ΠS +

X

πS )

i=1

which shows that, as usual, distributive eﬃciency would require to reduce as much as possible firms’
profits in the two markets. The regulator then optimally sets the transfer at a level T S so that the
participation constraint binds and the conglomerate earns no additional profits with respect to π S ,
i.e. ΠS = 0. Furthermore, the optimal regulated quantity q S is set eﬃciently so that the price in
the regulated sector is equal to the marginal cost, i.e. p(q S ) = ∂C(q S , 0; θ)/∂q. For future reference
we indicate with C S ≡ (q S , T S ) this optimal regulatory policy when separation is imposed and with
W S (C S ) the associated social welfare.

Joint productions and full information Assume now that the conglomerate is allowed to
integrate productions and that the public authority and the rivals are fully informed on scope
economies θ. Consider a generic strategic variable xi for firm i in market U so that xi = pi if
competition takes place in prices and xi = yi for quantity competition. The following system of
first order conditions
∂ΠI (x1 , X−1 , q; θ)
∂π i (xi , X−i )
= 0,
= 0, for i = 2, ..., n
∂x1
∂xi
yields the market equilibrium in sector U .11 For the sake of convenience, in the following we express
profits as functions of equilibrium output levels y1 (q, θ), yi (q, θ) i = 2, ..., n:
π Ii (q, θ) = π i [yi (q, θ) , Y−i (q, θ)] , for i = 2, ..., n
ΠI (q, θ) = ΠI [q, y1 (q, θ) , Y−1 (q, θ) ; θ] ,
11

We assume that the conditions for an interior unique equilibrium are met.

9
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and similarly for welfare,
W I (q, Y (q, θ) , θ) = VR (q) + VU [Y (q, θ)] − C [q, y1 (q, θ) ; θ] −
−(1 − α)[ΠI (q, θ) +

P

i6=1

π Ii (q, θ)].

P

C [yi (q, θ)] +

i6=1

(9)

Anticipating outputs in market U and for a given (and known) θ, the regulator maximizes (9)
subject to the conglomerate’s participation constraint
ΠI (q, θ) ≥ M ax{π S , ΠS } = π S
where ΠS = 0 as shown above. Knowing θ, the regulator sets the transfer T such that the participation constraint binds for any θ and no extra-profits are given to the conglomerate, i.e. ΠI (q, θ) = π S .
Maximizing (9) with respect to q for any θ, the optimal regulated quantity with full information
and integration qFI I (θ) is such that
p(qFI I (θ)) = SM C[qFI I (θ), θ]

(10)

where the right hand side is the social marginal cost of q, i.e.
∂C[q,y1 (q,θ);θ]
+
∂q
´
³
n ³
P
∂C[q,y1 (q,θ);θ] ∂y1 (q,θ)
pU
− pU
−
−
1
i −
∂y1
∂q

SM C [q, θ] ≡

+(1 − α)

n
P

i6=1

i6=1

∂π Ii (q,θ)
∂q

.

∂C[yi (q,θ)]
∂yi

´

∂yi (q,θ)
∂q +

(11)

The optimality condition (10) shows that the price diﬀers from the simple marginal cost ∂C/∂q (the
first line in (11)) for two reasons. Since q aﬀects firms’ decisions in the unregulated market, the
regulator internalizes the eﬀect of q on distortions in market U due to market power. This is
illustrated in the second line of SM C where the price-cost margin for each firm are weighted by
the impact that q has on each firm’s equilibrium output in that sector (i.e. ∂y1 (q, θ) /∂q ≥ 0 and
∂yi (q, θ) /∂q ≤ 0 for i 6= 1).12 The third line in (11) indicates an additional reason to give up

standard allocative eﬃciency in the regulated market, now due to a distributional concern. By
inducing the regulated firm to produce more in market R, the regulator reduces the profits of
12
This departure from marginal cost pricing is typical in the literature on mixed oligopolies (see for example De
Fraja and Delbono, 1990), where the firm under public control distorts its choices to boost the eﬃciency of private
firms.
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other firms in the unregulated market (since ∂π Ii /∂q ≤ 0), thus increasing social welfare through
enhanced distributive eﬃciency. Although these eﬀects may be possibly conflicting (contrary to all
other terms, inducing rivals to expand their outputs requires a reduction of q), integration tends to
expand regulated output so that q IF I ≥ q IF I ≥ q S , as illustrated in the explicit model of in Section
4.1.13

©
ª
For future reference we indicate with CFI I = qFI I (θ) , TFI I (θ) θ∈Θ the optimal regulatory con-

tract with integrated production and full information and with WFI I = Eθ [W I (CFI I , θ)] the associated (expected) welfare.

4

Regulation of a privately informed conglomerate

Let us now consider a conglomerate allowed to jointly run productions but also privately informed
on the level of scope economies θ. We can rely on the Revelation Principle so that for the case of
integration the regulator designs a menu of type-dependent contracts C = {(q (θ) , T (θ))}θ∈Θ which
maximizes the (expected) social welfare and induces the conglomerate to announce the true level
of scope economies to the regulator. By so doing, a conglomerate with scope economies θ selects
the policy (q(θ̂), T (θ̂)) by announcing θ̂ = θ.14
As a matter of fact, unregulated firms in sector U do not observe communication between the
conglomerate and the regulator (i.e. the announcement θ̂). However, the implemented regulatory
policy q(θ̂), T (θ̂) is clearly public information (for example, each consumer observes the regulated
price on her own bill), so that, knowing the regulatory policy C, rival firms obtain information

on θ by simply observing the (implemented) regulated price pb or, equivalently, the quantity qb

(in the sequel we will indicate updating with respect to qb). This is an important informational
externality of regulation which allows competitors to update their beliefs about the level of the

scope economies and then accordingly set their strategic variables in the unregulated market. It
is important to realize also that this informational externality in turn aﬀects the regulated firm’s
incentives to report θ̂, as we discuss next.
Given the (truthful) announcement of economies of scope, the competitive market game may
or may not be one of complete information. More precisely, if the optimal regulatory contract
13

If the regulator were only concerned by welfare in market R, regulated quantities would be smaller but still larger
than q S due to economies of scope.
14
Acting before competition takes place in market U, the regulator cannot infer any information on θ by observing
firms’ activities in that market. Furthermore, from the view point of the regulator, the unregulated output is a moral
hazard variable. Hence, the appropriate reference for the application of direct mechanisms is here the Generalized
Revelation Principle of Myerson (1982).
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contemplates discriminatory regulation (i.e. a “screening” contract) with diﬀerent quantities and
q) = 1
prices for diﬀerent announcements b
θ, the updating process is then perfect so that v(b
q ) ≡ Pr(θ|b

q ) = 0 when qb = q(θ). On the other hand, if the regulator sets uniform
when qb = q(θ) and v(b

regulation (i.e. a “pooling” contract) in which the regulated quantity qb does not depend on the
firm’s type, then unregulated competitors are not able to perform any updating so that v(b
q ) = v.15

Given qb, we can then illustrate the Bayesian (continuation) equilibrium in the unregulated

market in which the strategic variables (either prices or quantities) satisfy the following set of
necessary conditions,

∂
q ] = 0,
∂xi Eθ [π i (xi , X−i )|b
∂
I
q , x1 , X−1 ; θ) = 0,
∂x1 Π (b

for i = 2, ..., n
for θ ∈ Θ

where Eθ [π i (xi , X−i )|b
q ] is the rivals’ expected profit (with expectation over θ), conditional on the
q , θ, v(b
q )) the equilibrium output in the competitive
information provided by qb. We denote with y1 (b

market for a conglomerate with (true) scope economies θ, producing a regulated output qb and when
the rival firms’ updated beliefs are v(b
q ). Similarly, let y (b
q , v(b
q )) be the rivals’ output which clearly

does not depend on the true level of scope economies but only on observed quality qb and associated
b
q, θ, 1) , y1 (b
q , θ, 0) and y (b
q , 1) , y (b
q , 0)
θ. Consistently with our notation, we will denote with y1 (b

outputs of a type θ conglomerate and of its rivals when they believe that the true level of scope
economies are either θ or θ.
Since the regulator is uninformed on the level of scope economies, she must design a regulatory
contract that induces truthful revelation by any type θ.16 Consider a conglomerate with scope
economies θ which declares b
θ and gets the contract (b
q , Tb) ∈ C. This firm obtains a profit,
θ, θ) ≡ qb p(b
q ) + y1 (b
q , θ, v(b
q )) pU
q , θ, v(b
q )) , Y−1 (b
q, v(b
q ))] +
ΠI (b
1 [y1 (b
q , θ, v(b
q )) ; θ] − Tb.
− C [b
q , y1 (b

On the other hand, by truthfully announcing its scope economies this firm obtains a profit ΠI (θ) ≡
θ, θ) with b
θ = θ. Hence, any type of firm θ will truthfully announce the level of scope economies
ΠI (b
15

Few comments are in order on rivals’ updating. First, we implicitly assume that the multi-utility cannot credibly
communicate θ to the rivals. Second, entry in sector R is uninformative since regulation induces entry by any type
θ, as discussed below. Finally, we do not consider the possibility that the regulator could "fine tune" information
disclosed to the unregulated market. This would require a stochastic regulatory contract that we will discuss in
Section 6.
16
Although the announcement b
θ indirectly aﬀects (also) rivals’ beliefs v(b
q ), the eﬀects of b
θ uniquely take place
through the regulator’s instruments (q(b
θ), T (b
θ)). It then follows that the Revelation Principle is valid independently
of rivals’ updating.

12
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if

³ ´
θ; θ
∀b
θ ∈ Θ.
ΠI (θ) ≥ ΠI b

This incentive compatibility constraint for type θ can be conveniently rewritten as follows. Let
ΠU (b
q , θ, v(b
q )) be the profit earned in the unregulated market U by the conglomerate with (true)
scope economies θ, producing qb in sector R and inducing the rivals to believe that scope economies
are b
θ, i.e.
q , θ, v(b
q )) ≡ y1 (b
q , θ, v(b
q )) pU
q, θ, v(b
q )) , Y−1 (b
q , v(b
q ))] +
ΠU (b
1 [y1 (b

(12)

q, θ, v(b
q )) ; θ] − C [b
q , 0; θ]}
− {C [b
q , y1 (b

where the costs attributed to unregulated production is simply the incremental cost of y1 .17 Then,
truthful revelation is guaranteed by the following equivalent condition
ΠI (θ) ≥ ΠI (b
θ) + ΠU (b
q , θ, v(b
q )) − ΠU (b
q, b
θ, v(b
q )), with b
θ 6= θ.

In particular, the conglomerate with high scope economies θ prefers not to mimic the one with
small scope economies θ and vice-versa if
¢
¡
I
Π ≥ ΠI + ∆θ ΠU q, v(q)
I

ΠI + ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) ≥ Π

where

IC(θ)

(13)

IC(θ)

¢
¡
∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) ≡ ΠU q, θ, v(q) − ΠU (q, θ, v(q))

identifies the extra gain that type θ obtains with respect to θ when they both produce the same
regulated output q and induce beliefs v(q) on the rivals.
The scope economies announcement b
θ has here several interesting eﬀects. First of all, as in
standard models of regulation with asymmetric information, more eﬃcient firms have incentives to
understate their level of scope economies and to mimic less eﬃcient firms in order to obtain more
lenient and favorable regulation. This cost-eﬃciency eﬀect of the announcement is captured in
¢
¡
¢
¡
¡
¢
the term ∆θ ΠU q, v(q) by the diﬀerence −[C q, y1 ; θ − C q, y1 ; θ ] ≥ 0. Indeed, if the eﬃcient

firm with type θ mimics type θ, it produces the same regulated quantity q with a cost saving
corresponding the previous cost diﬀerence.
On the other hand, the presence of an unregulated market generates two additional eﬀects of

the announcement. A direct strategic eﬀect emerges since rival firms observe the regulated output
17

Being C[b
q , 0; b
θ] = C [b
q , 0; θ] , the cost in ΠU can be indeed written in terms of incremental costs as in (12).
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and they know that, because of property (2), if qb is large their cost disadvantage (with respect to

the conglomerate) is also large, for any given level of θ. We also have a beliefs-driven strategic eﬀect
which is the consequence of asymmetric information in market U and would not exist if rivals knew
θ. Indeed, observing qb the rivals may be induced to believe that scope economies are either large
or low depending on b
θ, whatever the true level of scope economies is. Hence, the incentive for the

conglomerate to declare its type also depends on the reaction of its rivals which is driven by these
two strategic eﬀects (direct and belief-driven), as we will further illustrate.
Anticipating all these eﬀects, the regulator then sets the optimal regulatory policy C ∗ maximizing the expected social welfare subject to the incentive compatibility constraints IC(θ) as in (13)
and the participation constraints
ΠI (θ) ≥ π S

∀θ ∈ Θ

IR(θ).

This leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 (Optimal regulation) Let q̃(θ) be defined for any θ ∈ Θ by
p (q̃(θ)) = SM C (q̃(θ), θ) + I(θ)(1 − α)

v ∂∆θ ΠU (q̃ (θ) , 0)
,
1−v
∂q

(14)

where the indicator function is I(θ) = 1 if θ = θ and 0 otherwise.

(i) Optimal regulated quantity q ∗ (θ) is discriminatory with q ∗ (θ) = q̃(θ) if
¢
¡
∆θ ΠU q̃(θ), 1 ≥ ∆θ ΠU (q̃(θ), 0) ,

(15)

otherwise it is uniform with q ∗ (θ) = q̃ where q̃ is independent of θ and solves
p (q̃) = Eθ [SM C (q̃, θ)] + (1 − α)

v ∂∆θ ΠU (q̃, v)
.
1−v
∂q

(16)

¡ ¢¢
¡
(ii) The profit of a conglomerate with scope economies θ is ΠI (θ) = π S +(1−I(θ))∆θ ΠU q ∗ , v q ∗

with q ∗ as in point (i).

To interpret the results in the Proposition assume for the moment that constraint (15) is always
satisfied so that optimal quantities are discriminatory. Then, as in standard models of regulation
with asymmetric information, the regulator must guarantee the conglomerate with large scope
economies (i.e. type θ) an additional rent ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) which corresponds to the higher profit
type θ can obtain with respect to θ when asked to produce the same quantity q and rivals believe
14
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that scope economies are low (i.e. constraint IC(θ) binds at the optimum). The (socially costly)
rent of type θ is an increasing function of the quantity designed for low scope economies (i.e.
∂∆θ ΠU (q, 0)/∂q ≥ 0), so that the optimal q is distorted downwards relative to full information,

and we (generically) have q ∗ (θ) > q ∗ (θ) (which justifies the rivals’ beliefs described above). If

the conglomerate’s incentives to announce the level of scope economies were solely driven by the
cost eﬃciency eﬀect, then this monotonicity on regulated output would also guarantee that the
ineﬃcient conglomerate (i.e. type θ) had no incentives to mimic type θ since, otherwise, it would
have to produce a large output q ∗ (θ) that is too costly given its low eﬃciency.
However, we know that incentives to announce the level of scope economies are also aﬀected by
the two strategic eﬀects which may either facilitate or hinder the regulatory process. Now, the role
of the two strategic eﬀects is best understood rewriting the incentive compatibility constraint for
type θ as follows,

¢
¢
¢
¡
¡
¡
ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 0 ≥ ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU q, θ, 0 .

(17)

which corresponds to (15) in the Proposition.18 The left hand side is the change of profits in market
U for a type θ conglomerate when regulated quantity is q and rivals consequently believe scope
economies are θ, as compared to profits with quantity q and rivals believing θ. Similarly, the right
hand side is the same profit diﬀerence for a type θ conglomerate.19

¡
¢
Notice that if only the cost-eﬃciency eﬀect were at play, (17) would simply reduce to C q, y1 ; θ −

C (q, y1 ; θ) ≥ C(q, y1 ; θ) − C(q, y1 ; θ) which would be as usual satisfied by monotonicity on output
q ≥ q due to properties (2)-(3) of the cost function.

With quantity competition in the unregulated market (i.e. strategic substitutability), a firm
which appears to be more eﬃcient induces its rivals’ to behave less aggressively, thus reducing their
outputs and increasing its profits. If q ≥ q, then because of the direct strategic eﬀect shifting
regulated production from q to q induces a contraction of the rivals’ outputs (for any given θ and
associated beliefs). Similarly, for the beliefs-strategic eﬀect, declaring large scope economies induces
the rivals to revise their beliefs and again contract their outputs. Both these changes account for
an increase of profits ΠU so that both sides of (17) become larger for the two strategic eﬀects on
the unregulated market. Furthermore, since higher scope economies amplify any change on profits
ΠU , the two eﬀects make the left hand side larger than the right hand side, thus making the overall
18

I

Substituting Π = ΠI + ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) (since IC(θ) binds at the optimum as shown in the Appendix) and
I
Π = πS (since IR(θ) also binds), constraint IC(θ) becomes ΠI = πS ≥ πS + ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q))− ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) which
is equivalent to (17) and (15).
¡
¢
19
If only the cost-eﬃciency eﬀect were at play, (17) would reduce to C q, y1 ; θ −C (q, y1 ; θ) ≥ C(q, y1 ; θ)−C(q, y1 ; θ)
which is satisfied by q ≥ q for properties (2)-(3) of the cost function.
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mimicking (potential) gain for type θ even less attractive. In other terms, incentive compatibility
for the ineﬃcient firm is less demanding than without the two strategic eﬀects and the regulated
output may be incentive compatible even if standard monotonicity q ≥ q is violated, thus making
the regulatory process "simpler".
If instead, the unregulated market is characterized by price competition (i.e. strategic complementarity), both the two strategic eﬀects have adverse consequences on regulation. In fact, the
conglomerate induces an accommodating response from its rivals if it now shifts from production q
to q so that the two strategic eﬀects reduce both sides in (17). Since these changes are intensified
by higher scope economies, the left hand side decreases more than the right hand side and the
two eﬀects make more diﬃcult to satisfy incentive compatibility for type θ. A further consequence
is that, contrary to standard models of regulation with asymmetric information, constraint IC(θ)
may be violated even if regulated output is monotone and, if this is the case, the regulator may
be obliged to give up discriminating with respect to scope-economies, thus resorting to uniform
regulation as indicated in the pricing condition (16).
The two strategic eﬀects are also relevant for the firm’s rent ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) illustrated in Proposition 1. It is now clear that the informational rent ∆θ ΠU of the eﬃcient conglomerate is larger
if mimicking an ineﬃcient firm induces the rivals to believe that it is really ineﬃcient, i.e. when
v(q) = 0. On the contrary, if the rivals were informed on the level of scope economies, so that their
beliefs would be v(q) = 1 in any case, then they would reduce their price by much lesser extent than
when their beliefs are v(q) = 0 so that, ultimately, the rent would be smaller, i.e. ∆θ ΠU (q, 1) ≤
∆θ ΠU (q, 0). It now should also be clear that the direct strategic eﬀect similarly increases the firm’s
rent with price competition and that, conversely, the two strategic eﬀects reduce the rent when
firms compete on quantities.
These results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 (Regulation with quantity and price competition) .
(i) With quantity-competition in the unregulated market, optimal regulation is discriminatory
with q ∗ = q̃(θ) ≤ q IF I , q ∗ = q̃(θ) = q IF I . The conglomerate is hurt by the lack of information on
scope economies of the rival firms and by the direct strategic eﬀect in the unregulated market. Both
eﬀects make the regulator’s task simpler.
(ii) With price-competition, optimal regulation may be either discriminatory with q ∗ (θ) = q̃(θ)
or uniform with q ∗ (θ) = q̃ for any θ and q IF I ≷ q̃ ≤ q IF I . In any case, the conglomerate gains by the
lack of information of the rivals and by the direct strategic eﬀect in the unregulated market. Both
eﬀects make the regulator’s task more complex.
16
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The discussion above highlights how diﬀerent forms of market competition have diﬀerent consequences on the ability of the regulator to design an eﬃcient regulatory contract. With Cournot
competition, eliciting information from the regulated firm is easier, so that the regulatory contract
benefits from the existence of a competitive market, where the conglomerate can freely operate.
The opposite holds under price competition, where revealing a firm’s eﬃciency may stimulate the
rivals’ reaction.
These diﬀerent eﬀects and the role played by the unregulated market in the regulatory process
will prove important also for the analysis in Section 5 in which we will discuss the (social) desirability
of joint or separate productions. Before turning to this analysis it is instructive to present a
simple explicit model which allows to further investigate the interplay between the regulated and
unregulated activities of the conglomerate.

4.1

An explicit model

Let costs be described by (4) so that the level of scope economies is simply assessed by the term
−θqy1 in the cost function and consider the following demands,
Market R :
Market U :

pR = γ R − q, γ R ≥ c
⎧
P U
⎪
⎨ yi = γ U − bpU
spj
i +

with price-competition

j ∈i
/

⎪
⎩ pU = γ − by − P sy
i
j
U
i
j6=i

(18)

with quantity competition

where γ U ≥ c, b ≥ (n − 1)s ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0 is a substitutability parameter.20
When the conglomerate cannot integrate productions, regulation in market R takes place under
full information, with optimal price p(q S ) = c and quantity q S = γ R − c and the conglomerate

is left with profit π S which depends on the type of competition in the unregulated markets. The
regulatory contract in this case is C S ≡ (γ R − c, −π S ).
Quantity-competition. Imagine the conglomerate chooses a regulated output qb but is charac-

terized by a true level of scope economies θ. It is then useful to describe the estimation error on
conglomerate’ scope-economies incurred by the rival firms when they observe qb, i.e.
q ))θq − θb
q.
∆ (b
q , θ) ≡ v (b
q ) θq + (1 − v (b

20

As usual, in case of price-competition, this system of demand for market U can be derived from utility VU [y1 , y] =
¢
¡
β+(n−2)σ
μ
σ
μ (y1 + (n − 1)y)− 12 β y12 + (n − 1)y 2 −γ(n−1)y1 y where γ U = β+(n−1)σ
, b = (β+(n−1)σ)(β−σ)
, s = (β+(n−1)σ)(β−σ)
.
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With discriminatory regulation we clearly have,
¡ ¢
¡ ¢
∆ q, θ = ∆ q, θ = 0,

¡
¢
∆ (q, θ) = q θ − θ > 0,

¡ ¢
¡
¢
∆ q, θ = −q θ − θ < 0.

If the announcement b
θ corresponds to the true level of scope economies b
θ = θ, then observing
qb the rivals will make no error. On the contrary, when b
θ 6= θ the error may induce the rivals

to over- or under-estimate scope economies. Finally, with uniform regulation q̃ we clearly have
¤
£
∆ (q̃, θ) = q̃ vθ + (1 − v)θ − θ .
Outputs in the unregulated market can then be written as follows,

(n−1)s2
2b(2b−s)[2b+s(n−1)] ∆ (q, θ)
s
(2b−s)[2b+s(n−1)] ∆ (q, θ)

y1 (q, θ, v (q)) = y1F I (q, θ) +
y (q, v (q)) = y F I (q, θ) −

(19)

where y1F I (q, θ) and y F I (q, θ) are the outputs that would prevail were the rivals informed on θ (more
details are in the Appendix). The previous expressions show that when the rivals overestimate the
expected scope economies so that ∆ (q, θ) ≥ 0, the conglomerate expands its production and the
rivals contract theirs, and the opposite holds with underestimation ∆ (q, θ) ≤ 0. In the former case
the conglomerate gains and the rivals lose and the opposite in the latter case.
In the Appendix we show that constraint IC(θ) is here equivalent to
¡

¢
q − q 4b(2b − s) (γ U − c) + q 2 k − q 2 a ≥ 0

with k ≥ a ≥ 0. This shows that monotonicity q ≥ q is suﬃcient but not necessary for incentive
compatibility of type θ, as previously discussed. Furthermore and along the same lines, in the
Appendix we also show that the conglomerate’s rent ∆θ ΠU (q, 0) is reduced by the error ∆(q, θ) < 0:
the imperfect information of the rivals indeed negatively aﬀects the conglomerate and favours the
regulator.
Price-competition. Equilibrium prices in market U are
(n−1)s2
2(2b+s)(2b−(n−1)s) ∆ (q, θ)
bs
pF I (q, θ) − (2b+s)(2b−(n−1)s)
∆ (q, θ)

FI
pU
1 = p1 (q, θ) −

pU =

(20)

where pF1 I (q, θ) and pF I (q, θ) are the prices prevailing were the rivals informed on θ. Now, contrary
to quantity competition, if rivals expect larger economies of scope than real ones (i.e. ∆(q, θ) ≥ 0),
then they reduce their price and, by complementarity, also the conglomerate reduces its price. It
18
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can be shown that conglomerate’s profit ΠU in market U is then decreasing in ∆(q, θ).
As previously explained, with price-competing firms conglomerate’s incentives to understate
scope economies are aligned in the two markets so that the regulator will find it more diﬃcult to
obtain information revelation. This reflects into the constraint IC(θ) which is here equivalent to
¡
¢£
¡
¢¡
¢¤ ¡
¢
¡
¢
q − q 2A + B q + q θ + θ ≥ q 2 + q 2 (n − 1)s2 θ − θ
with A > 0 and B > 0 so that monotonicity q ≥ q is necessary but not suﬃcient for incentive
compatibility. Furthermore, we also show in the Appendix that, the firm’s rent ∆θ ΠU (q, 0) is now
increased by the error ∆(q, θ) < 0.
We can now exploit this simple explicit model also to investigate the eﬀects of some specific
properties of the competitive market on regulation and firm’s rent.
Proposition 3 (An explicit model) Let cost and demand in the two markets be as in (4) and
(18).
Quantity-competition. A less concentrated or smaller unregulated market (i.e. larger n or
smaller γ U ) both imply a smaller informational rent for the conglomerate and a smaller asymmetricinformation distortion on regulation.
Price-competition. The eﬀects of concentration and size in the unregulated market are ambiguous: A more competitive and smaller unregulated market may increase both the informational
rent and the regulatory distortion.
With quantity-competing firms, any characteristics of market U, such as its dimension and
the number of competitors, that lead to an increase of y1 unambiguously aﬀect conglomerate’s
incentives over cost announcement. Indeed, the larger is y1 , the larger the scope economies term
θqy1 reducing costs, as well as the cost saving of firm with θ = θ as compared with type θ = θ.
Hence, when y1 is large, for example due to a large unregulated market or limited competition, the
regulator has to leave a larger profit ∆θ ΠU to type θ and this also increases the distortion arising
when scope economies are low. This shows that if a regulated firm wants to expand its activities
in one out of several unregulated markets, when competition is on quantities it should enter into
larger and less competitive markets, as expected.
Things are diﬀerent with price-competing firms. In fact, we know in this case the two strategic
eﬀects increase the firm’s rents and the regulatory distortions. Since the characteristics of the
unregulated market (i.e. n and γ U ) now have a complex impact on these strategic eﬀects (recall
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that optimal regulation may be also uniform), it turns out that, unexpectedly, a more competitive
and larger unregulated market may increase the informational rent and negatively aﬀect consumers
in the regulated market, as documented in the proof. In this case, the conglomerate would then
prefer to expand into more competitive and relatively smaller unregulated markets.

5

The desirability of horizontal integration

We now investigate whether allowing the conglomerate to integrate production of regulated and unregulated outputs is desirable at all. Equivalently, we study the desirability of allowing a regulated
firm to expand its activities into an unregulated and competitive market.
On the one hand, integrating production brings (large or small) scope economies, but on the
other hand scope economies are privately known by the conglomerate who takes advantage of this
private information with respect to the regulator and also the rival firms. In particular, as shown
in Proposition 1, asymmetric information associated with production integration allows the firm to
earn informational rents that are a social cost, and induce ineﬃciencies in the regulatory process
since the regulated price systematically entails a loss of allocative eﬃciency when economies of scope
are small. Furthermore, when the regulator cannot diﬀerentiate its policy on the basis of the firm’s
eﬃciency (i.e. when uniform regulation is in place), then rival firms in the unregulated market face
the additional problem that they operate under asymmetric information and this may negatively
impact on their profits and on consumer surplus in that market, as we will further discuss.
To analyze the desirability of integration and its pros and cons, it is first useful to consider a
couple of simplified informational environments that are instrumental to the analysis.
Consider first the benchmark where both the regulator and the rivals know the level of scope
economies which has been developed in Section 3. When the conglomerate can integrate its activities, also in this setup several eﬀects emerge on welfare as compared with the case of separation.
First, the conglomerate is more eﬃcient in its activities in the unregulated market where total
industry costs are then lower, as well as equilibrium prices. Second, the overall profits earned
by the firms in the two industries are reduced. In fact, total profits earned by the firms in the
P
P
two markets are π S + i6=1 π Ii (q, θ) with integration and ni=1 π Si with separation and we know
that π Ii (q, θ) ≤ π Si since with integration the rivals face a tougher competitor. Hence, with this
informational setup allowing integrated conglomerate production is clearly desirable.
Consider now a second instrumental environment in which the regulator is informed but rivals
are not informed on θ. In this case regulation would convey all the information on θ to the rivals
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since (generically) we would have regulated outputs q IF I 6= q IF I and prices pIF I 6= pIF I . Hence, again

joint production would be preferable to separation.21

This discussion seems to point out that, if anything, the problem with joint production should
eventually relate to the worsening of the regulator’s information. A partial answer is provided in
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (Integration and partial information) (i) If the regulator is fully informed on scopeeconomies, letting the conglomerate to integrate its productions is socially desirable, independently
of the information of the rivals in the unregulated market;
(ii) If the rivals are fully informed, then integration is socially desirable independently of the
regulator’s information.
In addition to point (i) discussed above, point (ii) in the Lemma illustrates a diﬀerent informational environment in which the regulator does not know the level of scope economies but the
rivals are fully informed on θ. The intuition for the desirability of joint production also in this case
is as follows. Imagine that with integration the regulator simply oﬀered the conglomerate exactly
the same regulatory contract C S that she would oﬀer in case of separation. Clearly, the consumer
surplus in the regulated sector would be unaﬀected relative to the case of separation because the
firm produces exactly the same quantity q S . The conglomerate would obtain a larger profit due
to scope economies which increase social welfare proportionally to the weight α (the transfer is
also clearly unchanged). Finally, being the rivals fully informed, the unregulated market simply
becomes more eﬃcient because one of the active firms (the conglomerate) now has lower costs.
Hence, the eﬀect of joint production is clearly positive.
However, as emphasized in the introduction, rival firms in unregulated markets often lament
their impossibility to ascertain the actual magnitude of scope economies of conglomerate firms, as
much as regulators do. When this is the case, none of the previous arguments is suﬃcient to reach a
conclusion on the desirability of integration and a more detailed analysis is called for, also requiring
to distinguish the nature of competition in the unregulated market.
Consider first quantity competition in the unregulated market. Indeed, one cannot rely on the
contract designed for separation C S because with quantity competition leaving the rivals with no
information may hurt the unregulated market. When the rivals do not know the value of θ and
do not receive any information from the regulatory process (as it is the case when contract C S is
21
The desirability of integration would hold in this case even if optimal regulation conveyed only partial information
on θ to the unregulated market. In fact, welfare associated with full disclosure is always attainable and larger than
that with separation, as discussed in the text.
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the policy in place), they act as if the conglomerate had an “average” level of scope economies.
In particular, when the real value of θ is θ, rivals underestimate scope economies and produce
more than they would otherwise do. On the contrary, when they overestimate the level of scope
economies, they reduce production and it may well happen that the contraction of total production
of the n − 1 rivals exceeds the expansion of conglomerate’s output.22 Now, contract C S may
¢
¡
then induce the following ranking for total output in the unregulated market Y q S , θ, v ≥ Y S ≥
¢
¡
Y q S , θ, v and, since gross consumer surplus is a concave function of total output, the net eﬀect

of integration on (expected) consumer surplus in the unregulated market may be negative.

Consider now price competition. From the analysis of Propositions 1 and 2 we know that, when
the rivals are uninformed, information revelation in the regulatory process is problematic; this may
well lead to large distortions on regulated outputs. The conglomerate has additional incentives to
lie to the regulator, hiding its eﬃciency. Because of strategic complementarity, if the rivals perceive
that the conglomerate is more eﬃcient they will react more aggressively. As a consequence, inducing
the regulated firm to reveal its type is more diﬃcult, and regulation becomes less eﬃcient. Hence
a trade-oﬀ emerges again: the greater technical eﬃciency which comes from integration entails a
larger distortion in the regulated price and a larger informational rent for the conglomerate.
Notwithstanding these negative eﬀects of integrated productions both with price and quantity
competition, the following result holds.
Proposition 4 (Desirability of Integration) Irrespective of the type of competition in the unregulated market, letting the regulated firm integrate and run joint production for regulated and
unregulated markets is socially desirable, even if both the rival firms and the regulator do not know
the value of scope economies.
In order to get an intuition for this important result, consider again the contract C S which
the regulator optimally designs for the case of separation. As already discussed, applying this
policy when the conglomerate instead integrates production raises a problem: with this contract,
uninformed rivals would end up with no information on the magnitude of scope economies. However,
with price competition (in general with strategic complementarity) the possibility that the regulated
firm has lower costs makes rivals more aggressive even if they do not know exactly the magnitude
of scope economies, thus inducing a larger welfare in the unregulated market. Hence, although
regulation C S is suboptimal and leaves the rivals uninformed, with price competition it still allows
22
In the explicit model of Section 4.1 this is the case when Y S − Y (q S , θ, v) = (n − 1)vqθ − qθ [2 + v(n − 1)] is
positive, e.g. when θ is suﬃciently low. Furthermore, although here not explicitly considered, this uncertainty over
θ may even induce some rivals to exit the market.
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to reach a larger welfare than with separate productions, thus making joint productions even more
desirable when an optimal regulatory contract is in place.
This reasoning is no longer true and cannot be employed in the case of quantity competition,
as illustrated above. Alternatively, to understand why integration is ultimately desirable even if
competition is in quantities, one needs to combine our previous results on optimal regulation in
Section 4 and in Lemma 1. The important reference point to consider now, is optimal regulation
when the regulator is uninformed whilst the rivals are fully informed on θ. Let us indicate the
associated optimal policy with C 0 . Imagine now to employ regulation C 0 when rivals do not know θ.
Notice first that C 0 (although sub-optimal in this case) remains incentive compatible. To see this,

recall our discussion in Section 4 showing that, when the rivals are uniformed and firms compete
on quantities, the regulator will find it easier to elicit information by the conglomerate. In fact,
the firm with large scope economies obtains a smaller profit and, at the same time, the ineﬃcient
firm finds it less convenient to mimic high scope economies when the rivals are uninformed. All
this implies that even if regulation C 0 is designed for the case in which rivals are informed, with
quantity competition in the unregulated market it remains incentive compatible also when applied
to the case in which rivals are uninformed.
Hence, although this policy C 0 is potentially suboptimal in the latter case, it induces truthful
revelation and, what is more, it allows to reach a social welfare that is not smaller than that arising
when the rivals do know the level of conglomerate’ scope economies. It follows that, a fortiori,
integration is desirable even if firms compete in quantities and neither the regulator nor the rivals
know θ.
Despite the asymmetric information on the level of scope economies that integration brings
about, and irrespective of strategic complementarity or substitutability in the unregulated market,
integration is preferable to separation: the reaction of competition in the unregulated market can
be ultimately turned to the benefits of consumers in the two markets and overall welfare.23

6

Discussion and concluding remarks

We have analyzed optimal regulation of a conglomerate firm that serves both a regulated and an
unregulated market. When the conglomerate is allowed integrate its production, economies of scope
23
As stated in Section 2, it is impractical to first let the firm integrate and then split it apart. Furthermore,
although one might conceive a contract, where the decision to integrate is taken by the Government, conditional
on the observed level of scope economies, even in that (probably implausible) situation our result that separation is
dominated by allowing integration would anyway hold with similar arguments. The general principle of unbundling,
often considered by regulatory authorities, is thus a dominated policy.

23

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper316

24

Scarpa and Calzolari: On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversifie

reduce costs, but the magnitude of these economies is not perfectly known to the regulator and to
competitors in the unregulated market, so regulation is distorted by asymmetric information and
competition in the unregulated market may also be aﬀected adversely. The regulator must therefore
take into account how the unregulated market reacts to decisions in the regulated one, because this
in turn aﬀects the conglomerate’s incentives in its regulated activity. A notable eﬀect of regulation is
an informational externality: regulatory policy action conveys valuable information to the rival firms
and its eﬀects (on both markets) depend on the nature of competition in the unregulated market.
Accordingly, we discussed optimal regulation and its distortions due to asymmetric information
when competition in the unregulated market bears, alternatively, on quantities or on prices. We
have shown that with quantity competition this externality simplifies the task of the regulator,
whereas price competition complicates it.
We then addressed the issue of desirability of joint production in the conglomerate’s activities,
where a potential trade-oﬀ emerges. On one hand, allowing the conglomerate to integrate productions reduces its costs and, if this is at least partially passed on in the form of lower prices, then
consumers may benefit (possibly in both markets). On the other hand, the conglomerate’s private
information makes the regulator’s task more diﬃcult, engendering distortions in regulatory policy
and may also make the unregulated market less competitive. Notwithstanding this trade-oﬀ, we
show that if uncertainty bears solely on the magnitude of scope economies and diseconomies are
ruled out, then integrated production is socially desirable; and if allowed to do so, the conglomerate
will exploit this opportunity.
Other potential benefits of integrated production relate to the demand side. For example,
customers would clearly find it advantageous having only one provider for both services (joint
billing, lower transaction costs summarized in the expression “one stop shop”). Our model can
be actually reinterpreted as one where consumers get higher utility from single bill: the crossmarket eﬀect may go through the utility function rather than the economies of scope that we have
considered.
We have not explicitly considered here diseconomies of scope (which in our model would correspond to θ < 0). If such diseconomies were possible, then clearly the desirability of integration of
the conglomerate’s activities (for example motivated by managers’ desire to build their own "empires") may not hold and the regulator should add to the drawbacks of integration also the risk of
a less eﬃcient conglomerate.
Interestingly, our analysis could also be extended over a long run horizon with free entry. Indeed, in this case the zero-profit condition (for rival firms) would make our arguments even simpler.
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Without going into analytic details, one may consider that with zero profits in the unregulated market what counts is really consumer surplus, so that allowing integration has a more straightforward
impact on price and hence on welfare. In case production in the unregulated market entails a fixed
cost, notice moreover that integration would also reduce the duplication eﬀect noted by Vickers
(1995).
At least two relevant extensions of the current framework can be conceived. So far, we have
considered a situation, where the public authority deciding on integration and the one which sets
the regulatory policy share the same objective function. In the EU, while some structural decisions
in sectors such as energy or transport are taken at European level, specific regulatory policies are
decided by national regulatory authorities. In this case, it may well be that the regulated price
dose not fully consider the surplus generated in the competitive sector.
This case has some similarities with our model, but it also entails a few diﬀerences. A national
sectoral regulator would in any case anticipate that the firm’s incentives are aﬀected by its activities
in the unregulated market, so that the analysis of incentive compatibility, participation decisions
and regulation (which we have carried out in Section 4) would be left qualitatively unaﬀected.
However, a delegation problem would emerge, in that the sectoral regulator would have an objective
function, which is not fully in line with the one of the European "principal" who is in charge of
structural decisions. We leave this line of research to future work.
A second possible extension could further exploit the informative role played by regulatory
policy. In this paper, this informational externality from regulation towards the unregulated market
has been framed as a straight dichotomy: either the policy informs the rivals fully or it provides
no information at all. Although this simple policy framework is robust (eliminating the possibility
that the regulator and the conglomerate collude on the information externality to the unregulated
market), it might be suboptimal, if the regulator could “fine tune” information to the unregulated
market. As the regulated price is naturally observable, a more sophisticated disclosure policy would
then require stochastic regulatory contracts that reveal information only partially.24 However, it
is important to notice that our results on the desirability of an integrated conglomerate would
not be aﬀected by this extension. Indeed, a more sophisticated regulatory policy that optimally
controls for the information flow would actually make integrated production by the conglomerate
even more beneficial. It may be interesting to study the properties of optimal regulation associated
with an optimal disclosure policy, for example along the lines illustrated in Calzolari and Pavan
24
Interestingly, the optimality of stochastic regulatory contracts may emerge in a context in which, absent the
informative role of the regulatory policy, the optimal contract would be deterministic, as in standard models of
regulation with asymmetric information.
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(2006). With this respect, our results suggest that when competition in the unregulated market
bears on quantities, disclosure should be optimal, while with price competition a “no disclosure”
policy appears to be preferable. This is an interesting challenge that we plan to explore further in
future research.
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7

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. Step 1. The regulatory program is

(P I )

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨

M ax

{(q(θ),ΠI (θ))}θ∈Θ

ª
©
Eθ W I [q, (y1 (q, θ, v(q)) , Y−1 (q, v(q))) , θ]

s.t.
³ ´
³ ´
⎪
I (θ) ≥ ΠI b
b
⎪
Π
θ;
θ
∀
θ, θ ∈ Θ × Θ IC(θ)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ ΠI (θ) ≥ π S
∀θ ∈ Θ
IR(θ)

where the objective is defined as in (9) with the diﬀerence that outputs in market U also depend
on beliefs v(q).25
The set of constraints IC(θ) and IR(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ can be rewritten as follows,
¢
¡
I
Π ≥ ΠI + ∆θ ΠU q, v(q) ,
I

I

Π + ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) ≥ Π ,
I

Π ≥ πS ,

IC(θ)
IC(θ)
IR(θ)

ΠI ≥ π S .

IR(θ)

For given quantity q and associated beliefs of the rival firms v(q), a more eﬃcient firm obtains in
market U a larger profit so that ∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) > 0 for any q > 0. Hence, constraints IC(θ) and
IR(θ) imply that IR(θ) is slack and can be disregarded. This in turn means that constraint IR(θ)
must be binding at the optimum. In fact, at least one of the two participation constraints has
I

to be binding at the optimum, because, otherwise, the regulator could reduce both profits ΠI , Π

by an equal amount, thus keeping incentive compatibility unaﬀected and increasing the objective
I

function. Furthermore, constraint IC(θ) must also be binding at the optimum. In fact, reducing Π

the regulator is able to increase the objective function without negatively aﬀecting IC(θ). Hence,
I

she optimally reduces Π as much as possible up to the point in which constraint IC(θ) binds.
As for constraint IC(θ), this can be written as
¢
¡
∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) ≥ ∆θ ΠU q, v(q) .

(21)

¡ ¢
Note that if q = q, then v(q) = v(q) so that ∆θ ΠU (q, v) = ∆θ ΠU q, v and constraint IC(θ) is

trivially satisfied. The case with q 6= q will be treated in the next steps.
©

25

With the usual
change of variables, maximization in program (P I ) is equivalently taken over the contract
ª
I
(q (θ) , Π (θ)) θ∈Θ instead of {(q (θ) , T (θ))}θ∈Θ . In both cases we will indicate the contract with C.

28

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

29

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 316 [2009]

Step 2. Using step 1, we can now further rewrite program (P I ) in the following equivalent way
⎧
n
P
⎪
⎪
M
ax
E
θ VR (q) + VU [Y (q, θ)] − C [q, y1 (q, θ) ; θ] −
⎪
i6=1 C [yi (q, θ)] +
⎪
⎨ (q̄,q)
o
¢
¡
P
I (q, θ) − (1 − α)v∆ Π
(P 0 )
−(1
−
α)
π
θ U q, v(q)
i6=1 i
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ s.t. ∆ Π (q, v(q)) ≥ ∆ Π ¡q, v(q)¢
IC(θ)
θ U
θ U

Hence, let q̃(θ) for θ ∈ Θ be solution of the following two first order conditions
∂SMC (q,θ)
∂q
∂SMC (q,θ)
∂q

=0
v
− (1 − α) 1−v

∂∆θ ΠU (q,0)
∂q

=0

where v(q) = 0 for q = q̃(θ), v(q) = 1 for q = q̃(θ) and generically we have q̃(θ) 6= q̃(θ).
¢
¡
If ∆θ ΠU q̃(θ), 1 ≥ ∆θ ΠU (q̃(θ), 0) , then the optimal regulated quantities q ∗ (θ) are q ∗ (θ) = q̃(θ)
for any θ, because these quantities maximize the objective in (P 0 ) and satisfy the unique constraint

IC(θ).

¡
¢
If instead ∆θ ΠU q̃(θ), 1 < ∆θ ΠU (q̃(θ), 0), quantities q̃(θ), q̃(θ) violate IC(θ) so that the

optimal solution requires that IC(θ) binds. Thus, consider a pair of quantities q, q such that
¢
¡
∆θ ΠU (q, v(q)) = ∆θ ΠU q, v(q) . This implies q = q. In fact, suppose on the contrary that q 6= q
¡ ¢
so that v(q) = 1, v(q) = 0 and ∆θ ΠU (q, 1) = ∆θ ΠU q, 0 or equivalently
¢
¢
¢
¡
¡
¡
ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU (q, θ, 1) = ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU q, θ, 0 .

This last equality is clearly generically impossible unless q = q, thus leading to a contradiction.
Hence, when IC(θ) binds optimal regulation requires pooling so that quantities do not depend on
θ. In this case, whatever its type θ, the conglomerate firm is required to produce a quantity q̃
independent of θ. This quantity can the be obtained by solving the following program,
n
P
M axEθ VR (q) + VU [Y (q, θ)] − C [q, y1 (q, θ) ; θ] − i6=1 C [yi (q, θ)] +
q
o
P
−(1 − α) i6=1 π Ii (q, θ) − (1 − α)v∆θ ΠU (q, v)

where constraint IC(θ) is omitted because, for what stated at the end of step 1, it is satisfied when
q = q = q̃.
Step 3. Given the optimal quantities q ∗ (θ) obtained in step 2 we then have that the profit of
the conglomerate with low scope economies is ΠI (θ) = π S from IR(θ) binding and for the eﬃcient
¡ ¢¢
¡ ¢
¡
one is ΠI θ = π S + ∆θ ΠU q ∗ , v q ∗ from IC(θ) binding.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1. We first derive the ranking on quantities q̃(θ), q̃(θ) defined in
the text of Proposition 1.
We show that the distortion ∂∆θ ΠU (q, v) /∂q in the pricing conditions (14) and (16) is positive
independently of the type of strategic interaction in the unregulated market. To see this, for the
generic strategic variable x1 of the conglomerate in market U consider the associated the first order
condition,
∂ I
Π (b
q, x1 , X−1 ; θ) = 0.
∂x1
This condition depends on θ through the marginal cost

∂C(q,y1 ;θ)
.
∂y1

Now, the properties of the cost

function (1)-(3) state that (i) this marginal cost is reduced by a larger q, due to scope economies,
and (ii) this reduction is stronger the higher is θ (i.e. with large scope economies). Hence, for the
implicit function theorem, it follows that the equilibrium profit ΠU (q, θ, v) is increasing in q, in θ
and that the profit increase caused by a larger q is larger the higher is θ. Hence, keeping constant
the rivals’ beliefs for (i.e. for a given v) we have
¢
¡
∂ΠU q, θ, v
∂ΠU (q, θ, v)
≥
≥ 0,
∂q
∂q

(22)

∂∆θ ΠU (q, v)
≥ 0.
∂q

(23)

and then

With the sign of (23) we then obtain the ranking on optimal regulated output. In particular,
if with full information scope economies induce a larger regulated output q IF I ≤ q IF I , then (23)
implies q̃(θ) ≤ q̃(θ) with strict inequality if θ > θ.
Step 2. Notwithstanding the monotonicity proved in the previous step, Proposition 1 illustrates
that, quantities q̃(θ), q̃(θ) may fail to be incentive compatible. Here we analyze when this is the case
and we check whether these outputs satisfy constraint IC(θ). As illustrated in (21), the incentive
compatibility constraint for type θ is equivalent to
£
¢¤ £
¢
¢¤
¡
¡
¡
ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 0 ≤ 0.

(24)

We now decompose this inequality into the three eﬀects of cost announcement. To consider the
simple cost-eﬃciency eﬀect of announcement, let us fictitiously assume that outputs y1 and y do
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not depend on θ and q, in which case (24) would be

or equivalently

¡
¢
¡
¢¤
£
−C (q, y1 ; θ) + C (q, 0; θ) + C q, y1 ; θ − C q, 0; θ +
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢¤
£
¡
− −C q, y1 ; θ + C q, 0; θ + C q, y1 ; θ − C q, 0; θ ≤ 0
Z

q

q

Z

y1

0

¡
¢
Z q Z y1 2
∂ 2 C h, u; θ
∂ C (h, u; θ)
dudh −
dudh ≤ 0.
∂y1 ∂q
∂y1 ∂q
0
q

It is then immediate that properties of the cost function (1)-(3) imply that the previous inequality
is satisfied by standard monotonicity, i.e. for q ≤ q.. Hence, the cost-eﬃciency eﬀect alone would
¡
¢
imply that outputs q̃(θ), q̃(θ) are implementable.
We now add the direct strategic eﬀect reintroducing the dependence of y1 and y on θ and q, but

keeping the rivals’ beliefs unchanged. To this end let assume that rivals are fully informed so that
even if regulated output is q(θ̂) and real scope economies are associated to type θ, rivals’ beliefs are
still such that Pr(θ|q(θ̂)) = 1. Constraint (24) would then be
¢¤ £
¢
¢¤
¡
¡
¡
£
ΠU (q, θ, 0) − ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 1 =
R q ∂ΠU (h,θ,1)
R q ∂ΠU (h,θ,0)
dh − q
dh ≤ 0
∂q
∂q
q

(25)

where the notable diﬀerence with (24) is that rivals’ beliefs on θ are always correct: independently
of q then v(q) = 1 if type is θ and v(q) = 0 if θ. Now, from (1)-(3) we know that the marginal cost
of y1 is decreasing in q for any θ, i.e.

∂ 2 C(q,y1 ;θ)
∂q∂y1

≤ 0 and this marginal cost reduction associated

with a larger q is larger the higher is θ.. Hence, independently of the type of competition we have,
¢
¡
∂ΠU q, θ, 1
∂ΠU (q, θ, 0)
≤
.
0≤
∂q
∂q
These inequalities imply that for both the cost-eﬃciency and the direct strategic eﬀects, constraint
(25) is verified by the simple monotonicity condition for outputs q ≤ q.
We are now left to study the belief-related strategic eﬀect. Adding and subtracting ΠU (q, θ, 0)
¢
¡
and ΠU q, θ, 0 from (24), constraint IC(θ) becomes
£
£
¢
¤¤
¡
ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU (q, θ, 0) − ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU (q, θ, 0) −
¡
¡
¡
¡
£
¢
¢ £
¢
¢¤¤
ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU q, θ, 0
≤ 0,
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or, equivalently
£
¢
¢¤
¡
¡
ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU (q, θ, 0) − ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 0 +
¶ ¸
∙ µ
R q ∂ΠU (h,θ,0) ∂ΠU (h,θ,0)
dh ≤ 0.
−
− q
∂q
∂q

(26)

The second line is negative whenever q ≤ q for the same reasons illustrated above on the direct
strategic eﬀect. On the contrary, the sign of the first line depends on the type of competition
in market U. The function ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU (q, θ, 0) uniquely refers to the eﬀect of a change of
rivals’ beliefs for any q and θ, that is for given marginal costs of y1 . With quantity competition,
or more generally with strategic substitutability, we clearly have ΠU (q, θ, 1) ≥ ΠU (q, θ, 0) , whilst
ΠU (q, θ, 1) ≤ ΠU (q, θ, 0) with price competition or strategic complementarity. Furthermore, the
absolute value |ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU (q, θ, 0)| is increasing in θ because a smaller marginal cost of y1
(induced by a larger θ) amplifies the change induced by diﬀerent beliefs, so that we have
£
¢
¢¤
¡
¡
ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU (q, θ, 0) − ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 0 ≤ 0
£
¢
¢¤
¡
¡
ΠU (q, θ, 1) − ΠU (q, θ, 0) − ΠU q, θ, 1 − ΠU q, θ, 0 ≥ 0

with substitutability,

(27)

with complementarity.

From the signs in (27) and IC(θ) written as (26) we then obtain the following.
First, with strategic complementarity in market U the sign in (27) implies that monotonicity
q ≤ q be not suﬃcient to satisfy IC(θ). When the (absolute value of the) first line in (26) is larger
than the second line in the case q = q̃(θ), q = q̃(θ), then quantities q̃(θ) are not incentive compatible
in which case optimal regulation is uniform and defined by (16). Quantity q̃ is obtained from a
pricing condition averaging with respect to type θ and θ so that q̃ ≤ q IF I but q̃ R q IF I because two
countervailing eﬀects are at play. On one side, the distortionary term

∂∆θ ΠU (q̃,v)
∂q

in (16) reduces

q̃.. On the other side, the averaging with respect tot θ and θ increases q̃ as compared with q IF I ..
Furthermore, for the same reasons, we also have that q̃(θ) ≤ q̃ ≤ q̃(θ) so that ∆θ ΠU (q̃, v) ≥
∆θ ΠU (q̃(θ), 0) which implies that the conglomerate gains and the regulator’s task is complicated
by the rivals being uninformed on the level of scope economies. Finally, if the first line in (26)
is larger than the second line with q = q̃(θ), q = q̃(θ), then optimal regulation is discriminatory,
q ∗ = q̃(θ) ≤ q IF I , q ∗ = q̃(θ) = q IF I . That the conglomerate gains from the rivals being uniformed
¡ ¢
can be seen in this case with discriminatory regulation by considering the firm’s rent ΠI θ =

π S + ∆θ ΠU (q ∗ , 0) where ∆θ ΠU (q ∗ , 0) = ΠU (q, θ, 0) − ΠU (q, θ, 0). For strategic complementarity we
have that ΠU (q, θ, 0) ≥ ΠU (q, θ, 1) and also in this case the conglomerate benefits being the rivals
uninformed.
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With strategic substitutability, the monotonicity q ≤ q implies that the incentive compatibility
constraint (24) is satisfied from which it follows that optimal regulated quantities are q̃(θ), q̃(θ)
defined by (14). This in turn gives the the comparison with quantities in the case of full information.
Since the first line in (26) is negative the regulator’s task is easened by the rivals being uninformed.
Furthermore, since for strategic complementarity ΠU (q, θ, 0) ≤ ΠU (q, θ, 1), the conglomerate gains
¡ ¢
a smaller rent ΠI θ being the rivals uninformed. Finally, monotonicity q ≤ q is here suﬃcient but
not necessary for incentive compatibility.

Proof of Proposition 3. .
Quantity-competition.
Outputs in market U can be written as in (19) and the conglomerate’s profits ΠU as follows,
ΠU (b
q , θ, v (b
q )) =

¤2
£
q , θ)
2b [(2b − s)(γ U − c) + (2b + (n − 2)s) qbθ] + (n − 1)s2 ∆ (b
4b(2b − s)2 (2b + s(n − 1))2

.

(28)

We know from Proposition 2 that optimal regulation is discriminatory so that the optimal regulated
q, θ, v (b
q )) and y (b
q , v (b
q )) we have
quantities are q ∗ 6= q ∗ . Substituting y1 (b
¡
¢ 4b(2b − s)(γ U − c) + qk
∆θ ΠU (q, 1) = q θ − θ
4b(2b − s) (2b + s(n − 1))
¡ ¢
¡
¢ 4b(2b − s)(γ U − c) + qa
∆θ ΠU q, 0 = q θ − θ
4b(2b − s) (2b + s(n − 1))
where a and k are constant with respect to output and defined as
¡
¢
a ≡ θ(2b − s) (2b + s(n − 1)) + θ 2b(2b + s(n − 2)) + (n − 1)s2
¢
¡
k ≡ θ 2b(2b + s(n − 2)) + (n − 1)s2 + θ(2b − s) (2b + s(n − 1))

¡
¢
with a ≥ 0, k ≥ 0 and a − k = −2(n − 1)s2 θ − θ ≤ 0.

¡ ¢
>From these expressions for ∆θ ΠU (q, 1) and ∆θ ΠU q, 0 we obtain

¡ ¢
¡
¢ 2b(2b − s)(γ U − c) + qa
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
≥0
= θ−θ
∂q
2b(2b − s) (2b + s(n − 1))

v
so that, as long as θ > θ, the distortion (1 − α) 1−v

∂∆θ ΠU (q,0)
∂q

in the pricing condition (14) for

θ = θ illustrated in Proposition 1 is strictly positive. Hence, generically we have q 6= q and q > q
(which also confirm that optimal regulation is discriminatory).
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Now, constraint IC(θ) can be here equivalently written as
¡

¢
q − q 4b(2b − s) (γ U − c) + q 2 k − q 2 a ≥ 0

which is satisfied when q ≥ q because k ≥ a ≥ 0. Note that, as explained in the text, IC(θ) could
be satisfied even if q < q (monotonicity is not necessary for incentive compatibility).
To verify the eﬀect of the error about scope-economies incurred by the rival firms on the con¢
¢
¢
¡ ¢
¡
¡
¡
glomerate rent recall that ∆θ ΠU q, 0 = ΠU q, θ, 0 − ΠU q, θ, 0 . Clearly, given that ΠU q, θ, 0
¢
¡ ¢
¡
is unaﬀected by the error ∆ and ΠU q, θ, 0 is increasing in ∆ q, θ we also have that the rent
¡ ¢
¡ ¢
∆θ ΠU q, 0 increases in the error ∆ q, θ .
Consider now comparative statics on the main parameters n, γ U :
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
∂γ U
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
∂n

=
=

¡

¢
θ−θ q
≥0
2b + s(n − 1)
¤
¡
¢ £
θ − θ q −2b(γ U − c) + s(γ U − c + qθ)
(2b − s) [2b + s(n − 1)]2

≤0

¡ ¢
2b(γ U −c)−s(γ U −c+qθ)
so that
where the second inequality follows from the fact that y q, 0 =
(2b−s)[2b+s(n−1)]
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU (q,0)
is negative. We also have
y q, 0 ≥ 0 if and only the numerator in
∂n
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
∂q∂γ U
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
∂q∂n

=
=

θ−θ
≥0
2b + s(n − 1)
¡
¤
¢£
θ − θ −2b(γ U − c) + s(γ U − c + 2qθ)
(2b − s) [2b + s(n − 1)]2

≤0

¡ ¢
where again the second inequality follows from y q, 0 ≥ 0.
Price-competition.

With equilibrium prices as in (20) we can write conglomerate’s profits ΠU in the market U as
follows,
ΠU (b
q , θ, v (b
q )) =
where

¤2
£
q , θ)
b A + qbθB − s2 (n − 1)∆ (b
4 (2b + s)2 (2b − s(n − 1))2

A ≡ 2(2b + s)(γ U − c (b − (n − 1)s)) > 0,
B ≡ 2(2b2 − (n − 1)s2 − (n − 2)sb) > 0.
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and the sign of B is implied by b − (n − 1)s > 0. In line with intuition, if the actual level of scope
economies θ increases, conglomerate’s profit increases and if rivals over-estimate scope economies
¡ ¢
(i.e. ∆ (b
q , θ) ≥ 0), conglomerate’s profit decreases. Hence, the informational rent ∆θ ΠU q, 0 of
type θ here can be written as,

£
¡ ¢¤2
£
¤2
¡ ¢ b A + qθB − s2 (n − 1)∆ q, θ
− b A + qθB
∆θ ΠU q, 0 =
4 (2b + s)2 (2b − s(n − 1))2

¡ ¢
which is decreasing in ∆ q, θ .

The asymmetric information distortion in the pricing condition (14) is
¡
¡ ¢
¢¡
¡¡
¢
¡
¢¢¢
(B + 1) θ − θ A + q θ − θ + B θ + θ
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
=
≥ 0,
∂q
4 (2b + s)2 (2b − s(n − 1))2

so that the solutions q̃(θ), q̃(θ) in Proposition 1 are generically monotone, i.e. q̃(θ) > q̃(θ).
With some calculations we also have
∆θ ΠU (q, 1) =
¡ ¢
∆θ ΠU q, 0 =

¢£
¡
¢
¡
¢¢¤
¡
¡
bq θ − θ 2A + q −(n − 1)s2 θ − θ + B θ + θ
,
4 (2b + s) (2b − (n − 1)s)
¡
¢£
¡
¡
¢
¡
¢¢¤
bq θ − θ 2A + q (n − 1)s2 θ − θ + B θ + θ
,
4 (2b + s) (2b − (n − 1)s)

¡ ¢
Constraint IC(θ), ∆θ ΠU (q, 1) ≥ ∆θ ΠU q, 0 , can then be written as

¡
¢
¡
¢¡
¢ ¡
¢
¡
¢
2A q − q + B q 2 − q 2 θ + θ ≥ q 2 + q 2 (n − 1)s2 θ − θ

which clearly shows that output monotonicity is not suﬃcient for incentive compatibility.
Consider now the comparative statics on the main parameters n, γ U . If optimal regulation is
discriminatory then
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
∂γ U
¡ ¢
∂∆θ ΠU q, 0
∂q∂γ U

= −
= −

¡
¢
bq 4b2 − 2b(n − 2)s − 3(n − 1)s2
(2b + s)2 (2b − s(n − 1))2

¢
¡
b 4b2 − 2b(n − 2)s − 3(n − 1)s2
(2b + s)2 (2b − s(n − 1))2

≤0

≤0

where the sign of 4b2 −2b(n−2)s−3(n−1)s2 ≥ 0 in the numerators can be derived by the expression
∂∆θ ΠU (q,0)
∂∆θ ΠU (q,0)
≥ 0 substituting A and B. We also have that the expressions for
and
for
∂q
∂n
∂∆θ ΠU (q,0)
can be positive or negative which is also the case for all the comparative statics when
∂q∂n
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optimal regulation is instead uniform.
Proof of Lemma 1. Point (i) in the Lemma is immediate from what stated in the text. Consider
now point (ii).
Let C S be the optimal regulatory contract with separation, let I 0 be the particular information

set in which the rivals but not the regulator are informed about θ, and let C 0 be the optimal regula¤
£
tory contract associated with the information set I 0 . Finally, let Eθ W I (C, θ) |I be the expected

social welfare associated with the optimal regulatory contract C and the associated information set

I, whilst W S has been defined as the optimal welfare with separation and its optimal contract C S .
Clearly, being independent of θ, the regulatory contract C S is individually rational and incentive

compatible when applied to integration with information set I 0 , i.e. C S satisfies constraints IC(θ)

and IR(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ. This allows to evaluate the expected welfare with integration when
the regulator oﬀers the regulatory contract C S and rivals are fully informed with EW I (C S , I 0 ) and

proceed with the following comparison:
EW I (C S , I 0 ) − W S =
¢
¢¤ £ ¡ ¢
£ ¡
¡
¡ ¢¤
Eθ VU Y (q S , θ, v(θ)) − Y (q S , θ, v(θ))pU Y (q S , θ, v(θ)) − VU Y S − Y S pU Y S +
"
#
n
n
¢
¢ P
¡
¡
P
+α
π I q S , θ + ΠU q S , θ −
π Si
i6=1

i=1

where we have indicated with v(θ) = 1 if θ = θ and v(θ) = 0 if θ = θ the rivals’ degenerate beliefs.
Both the second and the third lines are positive because the unique diﬀerence in EW I (C S , I 0 )

and W S is that in the former the conglomerate benefits of scope economies and is thus more eﬃcient
in market U. Thus we have EW I (C S , I 0 ) ≥ W S . Now, notice that regulation C S is suboptimal with

information I 0 so that clearly EW I (C 0 , I 0 ) ≥ EW I (C S , I 0 ) which proves the result (ii) in the Lemma,
i.e. EW I (C 0 , I 0 ) ≥ W S .

Proof of Proposition 4. We separate the study of quantity and price competition in market U ,
respectively strategic substitutability and complementarity.
Strategic complementarity (price-competition) in market U. Let I ∗ be the information set

in which neither the regulator nor the rivals know θ, as in the model setup, and C ∗ be the associated

optimal regulatory contract illustrated in Proposition 1.
With information set I ∗ , contract C S satisfies all constraints IC(θ) and IR(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ

because C S does not depend on θ and it is thus implementable. This allows to evaluate welfare with

integration and information set I ∗ when the regulator oﬀers the contract C S , i.e. EW I (C S , I ∗ ). We
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can now compare this welfare with the that associated with separation W S . We now have
¢
¢¤ £ ¡ ¢
£ ¡
¡
¡ ¢¤
EW I (C S , I ∗ ) − W S = Eθ VU Y (q S , θ, v) − Y (q S , θ, v)pU Y (q S , θ, v) − VU Y S − Y S pU Y S +
"
#
n
n
¡ S ¢
¡ S ¢ P
P
I
S
+α
π q , θ + ΠU q , θ −
πi
i=1

i6=1

The diﬀerence between this expression for EW I (C S , I 0 )−W S with the expression for EW I (C S , I 0 )−

W S illustrated in the proof of Lemma 1 is that here rivals’ beliefs correspond to their priors
Pr(θ = θ) = v and Pr(θ = θ) = 1 − v and do not depend on q(θ). In fact, in the information

set I ∗ they are not informed, contrary to I 0 , and regulatory process associated with C S is totally
uninformative.
However, with price competition facing an integrated conglomerate induces the rivals’ to reduce
their prices and this increases both consumers’ surplus and total profits in the market U. Hence,
both the first and the second line in EW I (C S , I ∗ ) − W S are positive so that we have
EW I (C S , I ∗ ) ≥ W S .
Now note again that regulation C S is sub optimal with information set I ∗ so that with the associated

optimal regulation we have EW I (C ∗ , I ∗ ) ≥ EW I (C S , I ∗ ) which finally implies the result,
EW I (C ∗ , I ∗ ) ≥ EW I (C S , I ∗ ) ≥ W S .

Strategic substitutability (quantity-competition) in market U. We first prove that optimal
regulation C 0 for information set I 0 is discriminatory and in particular we generically have q 0 > q 0 .

Optimal regulation with information set I 0 can be obtained following the proofs of Propositions
1 and 2, keeping in mind that the unique diﬀerence consists in the rivals being fully informed.
Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 2, with (23) we show that, generically,

∂∆θ ΠU (q,v)
∂q

> 0, which

immediately implies that the optimal regulation C 0 with information set I 0 is generically monotone

q0 > q0 .

Now we show that contract C 0 is incentive compatible and individual rational also with infor-

mation I ∗ , i.e. it satisfies all constraints IC(θ) and IR(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ. This is again proved in

step 2 of the proof of Proposition 2. In fact, the only diﬀerence between information sets I ∗ and

I 0 is that in the former rivals are informed but they are informed in the latter. We know from
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the proof of Proposition 2 that with strategic substitutability the belief strategic eﬀect due to the
rivals’ lack of information relaxes the compatibility constraint IC(θ) so that any pair of monotone
outputs q ≥ q is incentive compatible (see (27) and related analysis).

This allows to evaluate the welfare EW I (C 0 , I ∗ ) that would prevail with information set I ∗ if

the regulator allowed the conglomerate to integrate its activities and oﬀered the contract C 0 . For

what stated above, contract C 0 is discriminatory so that it discloses perfect information on scope
economies. Hence, the rivals’ choices are the same in the two diﬀerent information sets I ∗ and I 0 so
that EW I (C 0 , I ∗ ) diﬀers from EW I (C 0 , I 0 ) uniquely as for the conglomerate’s rent:

©
¢
¢ £
¢
¢¤ª
¡
¡
¡
¡
=
EW I (C 0 , I ∗ ) − EW I (C 0 , I 0 ) = −(1 − α)v ΠU q 0 , θ, 0 − ΠU q 0 , θ, 0 − ΠU q 0 , θ, 1 − ΠU q 0 , θ, 0
¢
¢¤
£
¡ 0
¡ 0
= −(1 − α)v ΠU q , θ, 0 − ΠU q , θ, 1 ,

¢
¢
¡
¡
where for strategic substitutability we have ΠU q 0 , θ, 1 ≥ ΠU q 0 , θ, 0 . It then follows
EW I (C 0 , I ∗ ) ≥ EW I (C 0 , I 0 ).
Now, recall that Lemma 1 shows
EW I (C 0 , I 0 ) ≥ W S
and we know that contract C 0 potentially suboptimal with information I ∗ so that
EW I (C ∗ , I ∗ ) ≥ EW I (C 0 , I ∗ )
Hence, we finally obtain the following sequence of inequalities
EW I (C ∗ , I ∗ ) ≥ EW I (C 0 , I ∗ ) ≥ EW I (C 0 , I 0 ) ≥ W S .
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